Patterns of urban heat-wave deaths and implications for prevention: Data from New York and St. Louis during July, 1966 by Schuman, Stanley H.
EW’IHONhlENTAL RESEARCH 5, 59-75 ( 1972) 
Patterns of Urban Heat-Wave Deaths and Implications 
for Prevention: Data from New York and St. Louis 
During July, 1966 
STANLEY H. SCHUMAK 
Department of Epidemiology, School of Public Health, University of Michigan, 
Ann Arbor, Michigan 48104 
Received July 21, 1971 
Patterns of urban heat wave deaths in New York and St. Louis during July 1966 
indicate not only the impact of environmental stress on heat-susceptible segments 
of the population but provide clues to the possible prevention of such deaths. While 
mortality from all causes increased by 36% in New York and by 56% in St. Louis 
certain subgroups were at substantially higher risk (persons over age 65; census- 
tract residents with low income, crowding, or poor housing; those with hypertensive, 
arteriosclerotic, cardiovascular, or other circulatory disease, diabetes, or chronic 
respiratory disease). The oppressiveness of heat waves in cities is emphasized by 
increased rates of homicide and by clashes with police in the streets. On the brighter 
side, pediatric deaths were controlled during heat episodes in both cities, suggesting 
that medical, social, and environmental measures can intervene. 
Unless the general approach to urban heat waves becomes prospective rather 
than retrospective, one can anticipate episodes of excess mortality during the summers 
of the 1970’s with a human cost of about 136 excess deaths per million per week of 
heat stress. 
INTRODUCTION 
The summer of 1966 proved that heat waves (episodes of sustained high tem- 
peratures with or without high humidity) in U. S. cities are not a thing of the 
past, but a recurrent meteorological fact. That significant numbers of persons 
died during the heat wave in many U. S. cities indicates our failure to develop 
effective preventive measures for some heat-susceptible segments of our urban 
populations, and our failure to anticipate the consequences of heat stress in mak- 
ing our cities more livable and more healthful. 
METHOD OF EXCESS MORTALITY 
The method of excess mortality was developed by epidemiologists during the 
twenties to assess the impact of epidemics of influenza on populations and to 
derive ongoing expected curves of mortality which would give the health officer 
a baseline on which to plot weekly reported deaths ( Serfling, 1963). The result- 
ing curve of expected and observed deaths with an estimated tolerance zone for 
random fluctuation is illustrated for New York for the period April 1966-April 
1967 in Fig. 1. Here we see expected weekly death rates plotted as a 5-year, 
S-week moving mean with a 95% confidence zone (Weiner, 1968). Superimposed 
on the expected baseline (which has a summer depression and a winter eleva- 
59 
0 1972 by Academic Press, Inc. 
60 STANLEY H. SCHUMAN 
WEEKLY DEATH RATE, ALL CAUSES, IN NEW YORK CITY 
APRIL 1966-APRIL 1967 EXPECTED 8 REPORTED 
WEEKS 
16 20 24 26 32 36 40 44 
I 
48 52 4 6 12 
I I I I I I I I I II I I 1 
, 
I , I I I 1 I I I I I 
APRIL MAY JUNE JULY AUG. SEPT. OCT. NOV. DEC. JAN. FEB. MARCH 
MONTHS 
1966 1967 N.Y.C. HErdJH OEPT 
LEGEND 
” “““.” EXPECTED 95% TOLERANCE ZONE 
___ EXPECTED, 5 YEAR MEAN 
-REPORTED (DAY OF REPORT ) 
--- -- -- CORRECTED (FOR DAY OF DEATH) 
FIG. 1. Fluctuations in death rate in New York associated with episodes of heat (July 
2-15) and smog (November 23-26) in 1966, illustrating the method of excess mortality. 
( Source of data: New York City Health Department. ) 
tion) are the weekly death rates for the current year, plotted as they are reported 
by day of report (heavy solid line) and replotted as the rate is corrected for 
actual day of death (interrupted line). Thus, in New York during one 12-month 
period there were four periods when the death rate seemed to exceed expecta- 
tion: mid-April, early June, July, and November of 1966. The largest rise was 
accompanied by 2 weeks of excessive heat described by the U. S. Weather 
Bureau as “the result of a merger of three extraordinary high pressure systems 
that cover the central part of the nation, the Eastern Pacific and the Central 
Atlantic areas-a coincidence that amounts to a meteorological conspiracy to 
maintain unrelenting hot weather here. . . .” 1 Note that the peak of mortality is 
adjusted from about 15 to about 17 per 1000 population after the health depart- 
ment’s statisticians corrected for day of death. The small April rise and June rise 
are brief, not sustained, and not easily explained. The November curve illustrates 
a well-known episode of 4 days of air pollution which occurred during the 
Thanksgiving holiday in New York. Although a rise in deaths was widely feared 
during the hectic days of the episode and although morbidity for chronic res- 
piratory disease cases was reported, the corrected curve of weekly deaths by day 
‘New York Times, July 14, 1966, Section C-p. 39, “Relentless heat is almost a plot”; 
“Record hot spell reaches 101 here.” 
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of death (interrupted line) is well within the tolerance zone of chance expecta- 
tion This figure confirms the fact that heat episodes (like epidemic influenza) 
exert short-term, intense effects on mortality curves which most air pollution 
episodes do not. 
INTERURBAN COMPARISON OF HEAT-WAVE DEATHS 
Since Mary Gover’s classic article on excess deaths in major U. S. cities during 
the thirties, there have been few reports comparing the impact of similar epi- 
sodes in different urban settings (Cover, 1938). Similarities in patterns of deaths 
should offer some sense of replication and consistency; differences in the patterns 
should provoke searching questions. 
Thus, from a single summer, in 1966, which contained meteorologically similar 
heat episodes over a wide region, including cities of various sizes, it should bc 
poss;ble to learn more of the effects or lack of effcqts on urban populations. For 
simple quantitative comparisons such as numbers of excess deaths by age and 
by standard cause of death, the computations can be done retrospectively. As a 
minimum, such interurban comparisons should provide a means of grouping 
cities by severity of heat-associated mortality. For more complex analysis of heat 
wave effects one must focus on two or more cities in greater detail with propor- 
tionately grcatcr effort. 
DEFINING A HEAT WAVE 
Defining a “heat wave” requires that some description and interrelation be 
madr between the meteorological features and the mortality features of the epi- 
sode. The more precise the definition of the heat episode is in terms of days of 
record heat, or of comfort-index days above a certain level, or of rises of mor- 
tality above a certain percentage, the more consistent is the methodology. On the 
other hand, we are only on the threshold of measurement in the sense that we 
do not know as yet how many times in several recent summers has a given city 
experienced heat episodes without a concomitant rise in mortality; only the note 
worthy episodes are recorded or studied. From the viewpoint of prevention, the 
well-documented “escape” of an urban population from heat-wave conditions 
should be of equal iuterest to the “failure” of such a population to cope with 
heat stress.” At the present level of surveillance of heat-related deaths in U. S. 
cities, there is little risk of overreporting; only occasionally does the National 
Center for Disease Control note the rise in mortality in early or late summer 
which affects groups of reporting cities which the epidemiologists are following 
primarily for signs of epidemic influenza. Given that we have a relatively small 
sample of heat episodes in large cities for study, what new information can be 
gained that might be of use in considering recommendations for prevention? 
In Table I data are summarized from an in-depth study of mortality rates be- 
fore and during heat waves which gripped New York and St. Louis during July 
of 1966. The definition of the heat-episode period is arbitrarily selected to in- 
’ Personal communication: Dr. Thomas Downs, University of Texas School of Public 
Health, Houston, Texas, April, 1971. 
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TABLE I 
COMPARISON OF PATTJGRNS OF HUT-WAVE: MORTALITY IN New YORK AND ST. LOUIS 
JULY, 1966 
Characteristic New York St. Louis 
-2. 
Population at risk, approximat,ely 
Duration of heat wave 
No. days over 90°F 
Mortality 
Excess deaths-estimated nunlber” 
All ages-proportion rise 
65+ years-proportion rise 







Race-sex group at highest, risk* 
Range of excess deaths by resi- 
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-18% to 2607;, 
a Applying the method of excess mortality to an arbitrary control period (see text): For New 
York-2 weeks of “average” mortality during May 7-20, 1966; for St. Louis-4 weeks of mortality 
during July of 1965 (7/2-7/29). 
b WF = white female, NWF = nonwhite female, NWM = nonwhite male. 
elude 14 days in New York (July 2-15) and 4 weeks in St. Louis (July 2-29) ; 
similarly the choice of a control or comparison period varies. A reasonable choice 
for New York might have been a e-week period in June preceding the period in 
July, such as June 2-15; but we have already noted in Fig. 1 that an abnormal 
rise in mortality occurred in mid-June for unknown reasons; therefore, a preced- 
ing period in May when mortality appeared more “usual” was the logical choice. 
The major finding in Table I is that approximately 1181 persons in New York 
and 618 persons in St. Louis died during the heat episode who would have lived 
beyond the summer of 1966. One may ask, how many of these deaths may be 
directly attributed to heat? In St. Louis some 130 of the deaths were assigned to 
the international category E931 (death due to excessive heal and insolation) but 
in New York only a handful of deaths were so coded, preference being assigned 
in New York to underlying circulatory and degenerative conditions. If one ac- 
cepts the usefulness of the method of excess mortality (as influenza epidemiolo- 
gists have found over the years) one can overlook differing customs of health 
departments and practicing physicians in coding deaths and concentrate on the 
distinct patterns of mortality in the available data. 
The impact of the heat wave was greater on the city of St. Louis than New 
York because deaths were up 55.8% compared to 36.3%. The age group over 65 
years was hardest hit by the heat stress, 52.6% rise over expected in New York 
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and 81.1% in St. Louis.” The fact that the cities have different populations at risk 
and had heat stress of different duration (16 days of maximum temperatures 
over 90’F in New York compared to 24 such days in St. Louis) may be adjusted 
by expressing the deaths as a rate per million population per week. The rate for 
St, Louis clearly t rceeds New York, 197.1 compared to 75.7. The combined 
deaths for the two cities gives a rate of about 136 excess deaths per million per 
week, or about 19-20 excess deaths per day of a severe urban heat wave. The 
other features of Table I summarize the data from analysis by sex and race and 
residence, and indic,rte clearly that white women were the highest risk group in 
New York (56.2% rise compared to 36.3% for all persons), that nonwhite women 
and nonwhite men were higher-risk groups in St. Louis (140.1% and 88.6% rise 
compared to 55.8% jr all persons), and that place of residence of the deceased 
varied enormously trom low areas of 10 to -18% excess mortality to high areas 
of +140 to +260% excess mortality. What are the reasons for such interurban 
and intraurban variations in deaths precipitated by urban heat stress? Assuming 
that differences of these dimensions in such large urban populations are unlikely 
to occur by chance, one must consider the critical variables in heat-wave survival 
(based on facts derived from years of clinical, military, and industrial research) : 
duration and severity of heat Ioad; physiologic reserves of the host; enviromnen- 
tal or medical methods of arresting the progression of heat illness (Burch and 
DePasquale, 1962; Leithead and Lind, 1964; Minard et al., 1957; Coburn and 
Reba. 1966; Lre and Hcnschel, 1966; Schuman, 1962). 
VARIATIONS IN HEAT WAVE MORTALITY BY AGE AND 
BY CAUSE OF DEATH IN NEW YORK 
Clues to the failure to survive the challenge of a heat wave are evident from 
tht data summarized in Table II, and in Figs. 2 and 3. The size of the New York 
population at risk (7.8 million residents) lends confidence to one’s analysis of 
deaths by subgroups. Thus, in Table II one is reminded that, whereas all causes 
of death were up by 36.3% over the May control period, only 6 of 16 major causes 
of death were elevated above expectancy. Arteriosclerotic heart disease ac- 
counted for 490 of the 1181 excess deaths and is illustratd in the curve for per- 
sons aged 80 years or more in Fig. 2, and in the curve for arteriosclerotic heart 
disease in Fig. 3. The “time lag” of a day or two before the rise in deaths occurs 
seen in Fig. 2 is most evident for persons aged 80 or more, but is more delayed 
for persons aged 45-64 years of age. The greater delay and lesser height of the 
curve for middle-age+ persons suggest the greater resilience to heat challenge 
for most persons agec 45-64 years; those who succumb at younger ages would 
suggest a group of premature, possibly preventable deaths. 
’ For purposes of comparison it should be noted that during the 2-week period cmding 
July 16, 1966 deaths from all causes increased 17.4% among 21 reporting cities in five East 
North Central states (Ohio, Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Wisconsin) compared to the similar 
&-week period of 1965. Deaths for persons aged 65 or older increased by 22.5X in the same 
region. These data are calculated from LMorbidity and Mortulity Weekly Report, vol. 15, 
1966, CDC-PHS-HE\.V, Atlanta, Georgia 30333. 
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TABLE II 
MAJOR CAUSES OF EXCESS DEATHS IN NEW YORK, JULY 2-15, 1966 





































Control weeks Excess in heat Excess as y0 of 
(expected) wave expected 
3250 1181 36.3 
13 1s 138.5 
53 62 117.0 
115 100 87.0 
190 160 84.2 
99 51 51.5 
1201 490 40.8 
50 18 36.0 
106 36 34.0 
279 76 27.2 
105 22 21.0 
68 14 20.6 
657 127 19.3 
169 30 17.8 
19 3 15.8 
88 13 14.8 
38 -15 -39.5 
(1 Miscellaneous includes all other major causes of death: hematologir disorders; postopera- 
tive complications; endocrine diseases (nondiabetic); neurologic disorders; senility; ill-defined 
conditions. 
The method of excess mortality demonstrates its usefulness in showing that 
while accidental deaths (including motor vehicle fatalities over the July 4th 
weekend.) were above a comparison period in May by 34.0% this excess was not 
unusual compared to all causes being up 36.3%. However, if we consider two 
other forms of violent death, homicide and suicide, a striking pattern of reversal 
appears in Table II and Fig. 3. After a “lag period” of about 1 week, the homi- 
cide rate for New York rises sharply while the suicide rate falls below the ex- 
pected daily average rate. It would appear that the cumulative effects of un- 
remitting heat can raise one’s threshold for suicide but lower one’s threshold for 
murder. Perhaps the anecdote recorded during the lo-day heat wave of August 
1896 in New York (3000 persons and 2000 horses dying) is relevant at this point: 
“ 
. * . on the corner of Bleecher and MacDougal streets, police were hurriedly 
summoned to stop a knife fight which erupted when one man jokingly asked 
another if the weather was hot enough for him” (Greenberg and Field, 1965). 
The effects of oppressive heat on human aggressive behavior are perhaps SO 
well known that further documentation is repetitious. Unfortunately, massive 
discomfort and disease does not make the news unless it erupts in violence. It 
is interesting to note that violence on the streets did not erupt in New York with 
the temperatures in the nineties while it did occur for two nights, July 13-14, 
1966, in Chicago’s West Side with the temperature only in the eighties. The set 
and the setting are obviously important where humans, emotions, heat, and 
crowding are involved. The reporter of the near race riot with scores of police 
and demonstrators injured from flying bricks, glass, and fire bombs, suggests a 
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FIG. 2. Daily deaths, all causes, for selected age groups in New York, July 2-15, 1966. 
provocative act : “For the second day in a row the police turned off a gushing 
fire hydrant along Roosevelt Road near the Loop, although it is a summer tradi- 
tion in Chicago to cool off with gushing hydrants.“4 
Among the causes of death listed for New York the category “respiratory in- 
cluding pneumonia and influenza” showed a rise of 64.2%. This drew the atten- 
tion of the epidemiologists at the National Communicable Disease Center who 
wondered about the 2-week rise in this cause of death as the signal for a mid- 
summer (?) outbreak of influenza; strange events sometimes happen, but this 
possibility proved to be a false alarm. Another possible cause of a rise in deaths 
from respiratory disease might be the combined effects of stagnant warm air 
and polluted air in New York. During the episode, the Neto York Times reported, 
“The pollution index on Wednesday, (July 13) was 13 compared to the usual 6 
or 7 for this time of year.“l The air-pollution levels did not approach the levels of 
concern that were attained later in New York in November, 1966 of over 20. The 
additive effects of air pollutants and heat on the cardiopulmonary systems of 
‘Associated Press to Ann Arbor News, July 14, 1966 “Fire bombs, shots fly in wild 
Chicago melee.” 
STANLEY H. SCHIJMAN 
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FIG. 3. Daily deaths, selected causes in New York, July 2-15, 1966. 
handicapped persons should not be minimized but heat stress would seem to be 
the dominant factor during July of 1966. A simpler explanation for the rise in 
respiratory deaths would be the assignment of deaths during the hot spell to the 
terminal event by many physicians (terminal pneumonia, following stroke, heart 
failure, chronic cardiopulmonary disease, etc. ) . 
The 34.0% rise in cerebral vascular accidents (CVA) in Table II is not impres- 
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sive but the timing of the sharp rise for the first week of the heat wave in Fig. 
3 coincides with the sharp rise in arterioscIerotic heart disease. It seems that 
coding of deaths attributable to cerebral strokes in New York differs from coding 
in St. Louis (see Fig. 5) and tends to understate the problem documented in 
heat wave studies in Detroit, Los Angeles, and other cities (!&human et al., 
1964; Bridges and Helfand, 1968). It is reasonable to conclude that circulatory 
handicaps will predispose persons to die during heat episodes regardless of the 
diagnostic category chosen for certification of death. 
Finally, it should be noted from Table II and Fig. 2 that the leading causes 
of death during infancy (less than 1 year of age) are not elevated during the 
heat wave. Related categories, such as digestive disorders and infection (diar- 
rhea, dysentery, dehydration), are not increased. These data illustrate the fact 
that pediatric deaths during urban heat waves are being effectively controlled; 
while geriatric deaths are not. 
PERCENT DIFFERENCE BETWEEN NUMBER OF DEATHS OCCURRING 
JULY 2-15,1966 (HEAT PERIOD), AND MAY 7-20,1966 (CONTROL) 
WG= Williamsburg-Greenpoint, FG=Fort Greene, RHG= Red Hook Gowanus, 
Bd= Bedford, Bw= Bushwick, SP=Sunset Pork, Fb= Flatbush. 
Br = Brownsville, ByR= Boy Ridge, Gr= Gravesend 
FIG. 4. Distribution of heat-related deaths among the 10 health districts uf BrotjkIyn 
July 2-15, 1966. 
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FIG. 5. Weekly temperatures and deaths (all causes and selected causes) in the City 
of St. Louis, July 1966. 
TIMING OF THE HEAT WAVE DEATHS IN ST. LOUIS 
Analysis of the heat-related deaths in St. Louis was carried out in similar fash- 
ion to that for the data for New York but not in as great detail (cause of death). 
Most attention was given to the timing of heat-related deaths and their place of 
residence. 
In Fig. 5, the deaths are shown on a weekly scale for June, July, and August 
in order to emphasize the surveillance possibilities available for earlier recogni- 
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tion of impending urban heat-wave episodes. In addition to the meteorological 
forecasting that is available on a probability basis, attention to the weekly pat- 
terns of mortality in a city such as St, Louis during the summer months might 
actually forewarn the community (again on a probability basis) to take greater 
precautions. 
The deaths can be plotted by day of death with more detailed temperature 
data but the cruder scale serves well enough to emphasize certain essential facts 
about the timing of heat deaths in St. Louis: (1) Actually 4 weeks in July were 
characterized by above-normal deaths for all causes; weeks ending July 9, 16, 23, 
and 30; (2) deaths actually began to rise during the week ending July 2; (3) 
deaths attributed to cerebral strokes (CVA) began to rise quite sharply and pro- 
portionately more than deaths from all causes; (4) heat deaths as such were not 
coded in St. Louis until 2 weeks after the deaths from all causes began to rise 
(perhaps the televised daytime all-star baseball game on July 12th with athletes 
and scores of spectators collapsing focused attention on the heat); (5) the de- 
cline in deaths from all causes was slower by 2 weeks than the decline in heat 
deaths, and (6) the decrements in deaths expected statistically in August to 
compensate for the rise in July do not become evidence in August for either all 
ca~~ses or for CVA. 
In retrospect, it would seem that if attention had been focused on deaths at- 
tributable to CVA (or deaths of persons over age 65+ years) as highly suscep- 
tible segments of the population during an incipient heat wave, the health facili- 
ties and environmental agencies of the community could have been alerted. 
During the week ending July 2, there were 25 death certificates coded for CVA, 
well within the 20-30 range of expectation, but by the week ending July 9, there 
were 47 deaths coded as CVA. On July 5th there were 10 such deaths, followed 
by eight more CVA deaths on July 6th! Thus, 18 cerebral stroke deaths in 2 days 
could have aroused suspicion at least 6 days before the baseball game and before 
general public awareness of a heat wave. 
In addition to the possible use of heat-susceptible deaths as a “sentinel” marker 
of heat-wave deaths, better environmental information should be available to an 
alert health-protection agency. Thus, the continued use of meteorological data 
from county-based Lambert Air Field for St. Louis weather is likely to continue 
a serious underestimate of the actual temperature conditions in the inner tit? 
where many of the heat-related deaths occurred. Similarly, the New York tern- 
pcrature readings are from Central Park not the tenements of Brooklyn. 
INTRAURBAN VARIATION OF HEAT DEATHS RAISES QUESTIOSS 
Careful study of heat-related deaths within metropolitan areas by place of 
residence of the deceased is fraught with methodological difficulties. The find- 
ings from geographical analysis of heat deaths in St. Louis and Brooklyn are 
presented (Tables III and IV, Figs. 4 and 6) in order to raise the epidemiologi- 
cal questions which must be asked, before preventive measures can be evaluated. 
Methodologically, one would like to have more accurate census estimates of 
population at risk for each census tract and demographic characteristics but 1966 
was an intercensal period. Nevertheless, it is reasonable to assume that the dis- 
70 STANLEY H. SCHUMAN 
TABLE III 
DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS OF SELECTED CENSUS TRACTS’ IN ST. LOUIS, JULY, 1966 
Demographic characteristics 
High-risk tracts* Low-risk tractsc City 
of St. 
Ldl MC Gfd NW Gdv Louis 
Population (thousands, est. 1965) 23.7 15.9 58.6 28.8 18.7 728 
Excess deaths 
Number 52 25 57 -8 -3 618 
Percent $260 +179 +110 -18 -10 +55.s 
Median age 35.1 26.2 29.6 40.5 43.3 33.6 
Race (% nonwhite) 38.9 52.8 97.9 11.1 0.0 35.8 
Median family income $3600 $3400 $3500 $6200 $6700 $5300 
Crowding (no. persons/room) 0.70 0.83 0.72 0.55 <0.50 0.64 
Q Census data from 1960. 
* High-risk tracts are: Ldl = Lindell, MC = Mill Creek, Gfd = Garfield. 
c Low-risk tracts are: NW = Northwest, Gdv = Gardenville. 
crepancy between poor housing districts and better housing districts in Brooklyn 
or in St. Louis in 1966 did not change too much from the discrepancy as mea- 
sured in the census of 1960. 
When the St. Louis data were first plotted and analyzed (Table III and Fig. 
6) geographically, the variation in excess death rates was striking. The rates 
ranged from -10% and -18% (in Northwest and Gardenville) to +260%, +179%, 
and +llO% (in Lindell, Mill Creek, and Garfield). Could such variation be due 
to chance? If not by chance, could the environmental stress differ greatly for an 
area such as Forest Park (+94%) with large acreage of parkland compared to 
an area of concrete such as Mill Creek (+179%) or Downtown (+141X)? As 
TABLE IV 
DEMOGRAPHIC CHAKACTKKISTICS OF SELECTED HEALTH DISTRICTS IN BROOKLYN, 
JULY 2-15, 1966a 
Health districts* 
Demographic characteristics WG Gr Bd Brooklyn NYC 
Population (thousands, 1964) 187 307 281 2615 7840 
Excess deaths 
Number 64 42 11 433 1181 
Percent 140 33 10 44.5 36.3 
Age of residents (% 65 years and older) 10.4 10.1 5.9 9.9 11.2 
Income measures 
Median family income $5500 $6600 $4400 $5100 $5100 
Rent (gross median) $59 $80 $69 $70 $73 
Poverty areasc 7/10 2/13 10/11 55/115 - 
Infant, mortality (1964) 31.4 17.5 41.9 29.4 26.8 
0 Census data from 1960. 
* Health districts are : WG = Williamsburg~Greenpoin~, Gr = Gravesend, Bd = Bedford. 
c Number of census tracts classified as poverty areas based on three indices by Poverty Area 
Study Office of City Administrator May 1, 1966, New York City. 
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FIG. 6. Distribution of heat-related deaths among the 26 census tracts of St. Louis, 
July, 1966. 
noted previously, the meteorological readings needed to answer such a question 
are not yet available although isothermal mapping of cities is a well-known tech- 
nique. Could demographic and housing variables play a part in the variation? 
The data listed in Table III suggest a pattern, where three selected high-risk 
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census tracts averaging +183% excess mortality during July I.966 are compared 
to two low-risk tracts with an average mortality of -14% during the month of 
record heat. By age composition, it would appear that the residents of low-risk 
tracts were distinctly older than the St. Louis median age of 33.6 years while 
Mill Creek and Garfield residents were somewhat younger. The racial compari- 
sons separate the predominantly white low-risk tracts from the high-risk, mixed 
racial tracts. If there is a mortality gradient by race (percentage black) within 
the low-risk tracts, the gradient favors being black (+llO% for Garfield com- 
pared to +260% for Lindell). It seems logical that the last two rows in Table III 
are most consistent in differentiating high-risk from low-risk census tracts in St. 
Louis, namely, median family income and crowding (number of persons per 
room). If we combine these data with those in Table I, we recall that on a city- 
wide basis, a St. Louis resident was at greatest risk if the resident was over age 
65 years, female, and black, and lived in a census tract with low family income 
and high crowding. Thus, the alleviation of poverty and crowding in the inner 
city as well as provision of medical and emergency services might save lives 
dramatically during urban heat waves. 
Although the contrasts between tracts are so evident in St. Louis, one could 
become uneasy about comparisons of census tracts which averaged 28,000 and 
ranged from 11,000 to 58,000 population. Thus, the opportunity to study a similar 
heat episode in New York with a population of 7.8 million was considered most 
advantageous. 
INTRAURBAN VARIATIONS IN NEW YORK, JULY 1966 
Although the heat-related deaths were up 36.3% for the city of New York 
(Table I) the five boroughs varied, as follows: Manhattan (20.0%), Bronx 
(18.8%), Queens (44.5%), Brooklyn (44.5%), and Richmond (37.9%), It was al- 
ready evident that females were at higher risk than male (50.4% vs 25.3%) that 
white rates were higher than nonwhite rates (3% vs 20X), and that white fe- 
males were hardest hit (56.2% vs 36.3%); how would the pattern vary by area of 
residence? For such detailed study, Brooklyn was selected as one of the two 
higher risk boroughs; it contains 10 health district serving populations ranging 
from Red Hook-Gowanus ( 157,000) to Flatbush (485,000). The excess deaths 
were plotted geographically as shown in Fig. 4 and again there appeared to be 
a striking contrast between one low district (Bedford 10%) and one very high 
district ( Williamsburg-Greenpoint 140%). Could these differences be due to 
chance? With populations of this magnitude at risk, it would seem to be un- 
likely. Could variations in microclimate between various parts of Brooklyn dur- 
ing the heat wave be important. ? Such data would be hard to find. Other vari- 
ables were available for study, shown in Table IV. Another health district 
(Gravesend) whose rate of 33% is somewhat below the Brooklyn average of 44.5% 
is included in the table for purposes of comparison. Here we see that the age 
factor is critical, that the Bedford population is distinctly younger than that of 
the other districts (5.9% aged 65 or older compared to 10.4% or 10.1%). Somehow 
despite its poverty ( lO/ll areas so designated in 1966) this younger population 
managed to survive the heat’wave better than any of the other nine districts in 
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Brooklyn. Were the high-risk groups of poor infants and children somehow pro- 
tected during this period of heat stress? If so, the mothers and medical services of 
the area must deserve some credit. This is in contrast to the high annual infant 
mortality rate of Bedford (41.9) compared to Brooklyn (29.4). The differences 
between Williamsburg-Greenpoint and Bedford underscore the importance of 
age and income: the poor older residents died from heat stress at a greater rate 
than the poor young residents. Gravesend at the lower range of heat mortality 
(34%) is characterized by an older population similar to Williamsburg-Green- 
point, but the level of income was distinctly superior for the Gravesend residents. 
Racial characteristics of the Brooklyn health districts were not investigated. The 
findings in Table I already suggested a white/nonwhite ratio of 2: 1 (39%:20%) 
for New York in contrast to St. Louis with a ratio of 1:3 (411%: 119%). If the race 
ratios were adjusted for income, housing, and age, would they be similar be- 
tween the cities? Such analysis would require more detail than the data now 
permit, but offer a challenge for the next urban study of heat-wave mortality. 
DISCUSSION: IMPLICATIONS FOR PREVENTIOh’ 
The picture of urban heat-wave mortality in the past decade is not reassuring. 
Given two major cities, such as New York or St. Louis, with a e-week period of 
unremitting heat (not necessarily record-breaking), a sharp rise in deaths from 
all causes is 1ikeIy to occur. In 1966, the human cost was about 76-197 lives per 
million residents per week of hot spell. This toll may not seem excessive, but the 
fact that the rate varied within each city by residential areas and by demo- 
graphic characteristics suggests that the poor, the disadvantaged, the elderly, 
and those with circulatory handicaps bore the brunt of the environmental stress. 
Those with higher income, better medical care, fewer handicapping conditions, 
air conditioning, or access to the cooler suburbs experienced normal or sub- 
normal death rates during the heat wave period. 
On the encouraging side, it should be noted that pediatric deaths due to diar- 
rhea, dehydration, and infections which were prevalent during the summers of 
the twenties and thirties in the U. S. were not increased during the heat waves 
in either major city in 1966. It would seem that the challenge of the elderly and 
the circulatory-handicapped residents of the city could be met with the same 
vigor, intelligence, and scientific knowledge which is working so well for the very 
young.” 
The preventive approaches to adaptation to heat-wave stress must include 
’ The age-specific analysis of excess deaths in the age groups under 28 days, L-11 months, 
and 1-14 years for St. Louis shows the following pattern: -12 deaths, +14 deaths, and +7 
deaths for July 1965 compared to July 1966. The numerical increase for the latter two age 
groups is small, but the percentage increase is notable. For New York, the increase over 2 
weeks was +21 and $49 deaths for age groups less than 1 year and 1-14 years, numerically 
small but proportionately significantly increases. The cause-specific analysis for the latter age 
group shows the increase to be among miscellaneous causes, including metabolic disorders 
( +2.3 deaths), accidents, including drowning ( + 11 deaths ), cancer ( i-9 deaths), and 
respiratory ( +8 deaths). Thus, the traditional causes of infant and pediatric deaths during 
heat waves are notably absent-gastrointestinal disease (no excess deaths) and infectious 
disease ( no excess deaths ) 
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three disciplines: medical, social, and environmental. From an emergency point 
of view, medical care is primary but from a preventive or longer-term view, en- 
vironmental change must be planned. During the immediate hectic days of an 
incipient heat wave, the emergency rooms and personnel are rapidly over- 
whelmed and a series of heroic but losing battles are fought. Even the medical 
skills and teamwork so hard earned during the heat wave are likely to be lost 
from disuse and personnel changes before the next heat wave occurs. During the 
less hectic days of planning for urban renewal, architects, engineers, and land- 
scapers can provide a margin of safety for beleaguered residents during heat 
waves-well-spaced parks and ponds; apartments and homes with cross-ventila- 
tion capabilities when the air conditioners break down or the power supply is 
rationed. The challenge for social change and improvement remains and is 
clearly indicated by these data to be equally needed by the races, by the 
crowded and poorly housed wherever they live, in the Midwest or the East. 
Finally, the morbidity, discomfort, irritations, and mental stress of heat waves 
should not be underestimated in the future as the quality of life comes to be of 
greater concern to the well-being of cities and city-dwellers. 
SUMMARY 
An unusual period of heat stress blanketed St. Louis, the Midwest, and New 
York in late June and mid-July of 1966. Deaths from all causes increased by 24% 
in three Atlantic states, 17% in five North Central States, 36% in New York, and 
56% in St. Louis. Subgroups of the population were hit harder (white females in 
New York 56% nonwhite females 140% in St. Louis). Residents of certain areas 
of the cities were almost unaffected by heat-wave mortality (-18% -10%) while 
in other areas deaths were up by 140 to 260%. Poverty, crowding, poor housing, 
and age are critical factors. Diabetic deaths were up 117%. ASHD and hyper- 
tension were increased by 41 to 52% in New York. Homicides were up remarkably 
while suicides were down during the hot spell, Sudden heat deaths (DOA’s) 
and heat strokes were coded routinely in St. Louis but rarely by New York 
physicians. The timing of the deaths and the relation to meteorologic conditions 
makes such variations in nosology irrelevant when the classic method of excess 
mortality is applied to the data. 
Not only do the cities fail to plan for the prevention of the adverse effects of 
heat stress on residents, but during the emergency conditions the medical facili- 
ties and environmental services are easily overwhelmed, the power shortages, 
lack of air conditioning, refrigeration, ice, relief areas, or emergency personnel 
become acute. Factories, labor and management, seem to demonstrate more con- 
cern for their workers than hospitals for patients, nursing homes for residents, 
or cities for their average dwellers. 
Surveillance of incipient meteorologic conditions is feasible on a probability 
basis, and daily monitoring of city deaths, especially the sentinel CVA group of 
deaths (or persons aged 65 and older) could provide a week’s warning before 
the full brunt of heat-wave deaths occur. 
Unfortunately, the grim patterns of urban heat deaths in the decade of the 
sixties are so consistent between cities (New York, St. Louis, LOS Angeles, De- 
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troit, Madison-St. Clair) that it is predictable that heat-wave episodes will recur 
in the seventies, unless the problem gains wider attention. Is it possible that the 
infrequency of heat waves keeps them in the realm of the supernatural rather 
than the scientific area of our thinking? The possibilities for prevention of heat- 
wave deaths are limited but they are within the range of our knowledge and 
skills. 
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